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FREE TO LEAVE? AN EMPIRICAL LOOK
AT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S SEIZURE
STANDARD
DAVID K. KESSLER*
So what do we do if we don't know? I can follow my instinct. My instinct is he
would feel he wasn't free because the red light's flashing. That's just one person's
instinct. Or I could say, let's look for some studies. They could have asked people
about this, and there are none .... What should I do? ... Look for more studies?
-Justice Stephen Breyer
Maybe we can just pass until the studies are done?
-Justice Antonin Scalia 2
Whether a person has been "seized" often determines if he or she
receives Fourth Amendment protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has
established a standard for identifying seizures: a person is seized when a
reasonable person in his situation would not have felt 'free to leave" or
otherwise to terminate the encounter with law enforcement. In applying
that standard, today's courts conduct crucial seizure inquiries relying only
upon their own beliefs about when a reasonable person would feel free to
leave. But both the Court and scholars have noted that although empirical
evidence about whether people actually feel free to leave would help guide
the seizure inquiry, no such evidence presently exists. This Article presents
the first empirical study of whether people would actually feel free to leave
Harvard Law School, J.D. 2009. The author would like to thank Professors Elizabeth
Warren, William Stuntz, Martha Minow, Richard Parker, Jon Hanson, Carol Steiker,
Adriaan Lanni, and Phil Heymann; Judges Michael Boudin and Richard Posner; surveyors
Abbye Atkinson, Sarah Bertozzi, Emily Caveness, Kurt Chauviere, Julia Lewis, William
Magnuson, and Lucas Watkins; and Jay Hook, Patricia Maloney, Elizabeth Ogburn, Richard
Re, Tejinder Singh, and Alyson Zalta.
I Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007) (No.
06-8120) (Breyer, J.).
2 Id. at 44 (Scalia, J.).
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in two situations in which the Court has held that people would: on public
sidewalks and on buses. Drawing on a survey of 406 randomly selected
Boston residents, this Article concludes that people would not feel free to
end their encounters with the police. Under the Court's current standard,
respondents would be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
in both scenarios. The data also show that knowledge of one's legal right
to end the encounter with the police would not make people feel free to
leave, and that women and people under twenty-five would feel less free to
leave than would men and people over twenty-five. This initial empirical
evidence suggests the need to rethink the current seizure standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
During recent oral arguments in Brendlin v. California,3 Justices
Breyer and Scalia both noted the lack of empirical evidence informing the
application of the Supreme Court's standard for identifying a seizure. That
standard mandates that a person interacting with a law enforcement officer
is seized only when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident," a reasonable person would have felt free "to leave, ', "to decline
the officers' requests,, 5 or "otherwise [to] terminate the encounter.",6 In
applying its standard, the Court has determined, without empirical
evidence, whether reasonable people would in fact feel free to leave or to
terminate specific encounters with law enforcement. For instance, the
Court has found that people would feel free to leave when approached and
questioned by an officer while on a public street or on a Greyhound bus.7
But would actual people feel free to leave in the situations where the
Justices believe that a reasonable person would do so? Although the
reasonable person described by the Court and the average person described
3 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007).
4 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). The actual
language in Mendenhall is whether a reasonable person "would have believed he was not
free to leave," id., but later references to the standard have used the wording "felt free to
leave." See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1991); California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 639-40 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Transcript of Oral Argument at 43,
Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 06-8120) (Breyer, J.). In addition, the Court seems never to
have drawn a distinction between "believed he was not free" and "did not feel free."
5 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002).
6 Id. This Article collectively refers to these tests as asking whether a person felt "free to
leave."
7 See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) ("We have held repeatedly that
mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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by empirical data will not be identical, they should be similar.s Data about
how the actual person feels, therefore, would either support or call into
question the Court's application of its seizure standard.
This Article presents the first set of empirical evidence that addresses
whether or not actual people would feel free to terminate simple encounters
with law enforcement officers.9 There are three principal findings. Based
on data from a survey administered to 406 randomly selected people in
Boston, I conclude that, in two situations in which a person is approached
by a police officer, people would not feel free to terminate their encounters
with the police. These two situations are similar to situations in which the
Court has held that people would feel free to leave.' 0 Furthermore, women
and people under twenty-five would feel even less free than average. The
data showed no statistically significant differences between races or levels
of income. Finally, even people who know they have the right not to talk to
a police officer would not feel free to terminate such encounters. Others
have predicted that people would not feel free to leave" and that knowledge
8 As discussed below, the reasonable person described by the Court should act and feel
roughly the way the average person described by the results of the survey should. See infra
text accompanying notes 161-68.
9 Janice Nadler has noted that "[tihe simplest way to determine whether a reasonable
person voluntarily consented to a police search is simply to ask them, 'To what extent did
you feel free to decline the officer's request?' Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 201. But she concluded
"that no one has asked this question." Id.; see Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between
Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment
Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 552 (2001) ("The author knows
of no scientific study on this issue directly, but there is no reason one could not be
undertaken."). Burkoff does cite an unpublished undergraduate thesis that surveyed Florida
State University students and law enforcement officers about whether they believed a person
would feel free to leave once he had refused an officer's request to search his car. John M.
Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1119-20 (2007). But that survey focused
on the voluntariness of consent searches, a question related to, but not identical to, the
subject of this Article.
1o See supra note 7.
11 See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 535, 555 (2002) ("[M]ost people who have been stopped understand that
they are not free to leave until the police officer tells them so."); Tracey Maclin, "Black and
Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should
Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249 (1991) [hereinafter Maclin, "Black and Blue
Encounters "I ("The average, reasonable individual-whether he or she be found on the
street, in an airport lobby, inside a factory, or seated on a bus or train-will not feel free to
walk away from a typical police confrontation."); Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News
About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 27, 28 (2008)
[hereinafter Maclin, The Good and Bad News] ("[E]veryone else knows [that] a police
'request' to search a bag or automobile is understood by most persons as a 'command."');
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 137 (2003) ("Would any reasonable worker feel free to leave under
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of rights would still not make people feel free to leave,12 but no one has
shown that reality with data.
These findings raise troubling questions about the way the Court has
protected the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 3 A person who
is seized by law enforcement officers may challenge his seizure if it is not
supported by probable cause, 14 and evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal seizure may be suppressed; 5 in contrast, a person who is not
considered seized (or searched) receives no Fourth Amendment protection
at all. Since the Court is finding that people would feel free to leave in
situations in which people actually would not feel free, the Court is
considering too few people to be seized. Those people who should have
been considered seized, but are not so considered under the current
standard, are thus deprived the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
To address these questions, the Court should consider changes to its
seizure standard. Two possible changes present themselves for
consideration. If one believes that the people whom the court is currently
identifying as seized should be identified as seized, then a solution would
be to change the wording of the test to bring it and its results into harmony.
If one believes instead that the courts are finding too few people to be
seized, then a solution would be to keep the current test, but to apply it
more realistically to the facts of each case. Either of these solutions would
improve the current situation in which some people who should be
considered seized are not. The data do not, however, support requiring
police officers to give a warning before interacting with potential suspects
or witnesses.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II provides background,
discussing the development of the Court's seizure doctrine and the existing
evidence about the accuracy of that doctrine. Part III provides the
methodology for the survey and discusses attempts to mitigate bias. Part IV
these circumstances? In the world in which most people live, the answer is no."); see also
RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
404 (2005) ("[D]oes the average person when approached by a police officer feel free to
terminate the encounter... ? Isn't the seizure test in fact a legal fiction... ?").
12 See infra text accompanying notes 88-110.
13 Steinbock, supra note 9, at 535-36 (discussing other troubling consequences of the
Court's jurisprudence).
14 A seizure is unconstitutional if it occurs without a warrant or probable cause, or, in
some cases, without reasonable suspicion. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 7-9 (2006) (reviewing the kinds of justifications
that make a seizure "reasonable," that is, constitutionally permissible).
15 Evidence gathered during such a seizure would be inadmissible in court. E.g., Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state trials); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the federal exclusionary rule).
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lays out the results of the survey, and Part V considers some implications of
those results, considering changes to the seizure standard.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the current views of the Supreme Court and
commentators about when people feel free to leave their encounters with
the police. It first discusses the Court's application, over the last thirty
years, of its free-to-leave standard for determining whether an individual
has been seized. In applying that standard, the Court has required a
showing of considerable coercion on the part of police officers before it
seems willing to find that a person has been seized. Next, this Part
discusses the limited evidence concerning when people actually do feel free
to leave during such encounters. Evidence from analyses of data on consent
searches resulting from traffic stops and a wide variety of psychological
research suggests that, in contrast to the Court's holdings, people rarely, if
ever, act freely and voluntarily when interacting with the police. Finally,
this Part explores the debate in existing literature about whether knowledge
of one's freedom to decline police requests makes one more likely to feel
free to decline those requests. There is no clear answer in the existing
literature.
A. THE COURT REQUIRES A STRONG SHOWING OF COERCION BEFORE
IT WILL FIND A PERSON DID NOT FEEL FREE TO LEAVE
Under the Supreme Court's seizure doctrine, not all encounters with
the police constitute seizures.16  A seizure occurs only when an officer
restrains "the liberty of a citizen" either through the use of physical force or
by a show of authority.17 While seizures resulting from use of physical
force are relatively easy to identify,' 8 the Court created a standard to help it
determine when a person was sufficiently coerced by a show of authority to
be considered seized. In applying that standard, the Court has set a high bar
for the kinds of encounters that qualify as "seizures."
16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("Obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.").
17 Id. ("Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.");
see Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007) ("A police officer may make a
seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is no seizure
without actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned.").
18 These seizures involved handcuffs or other ways of physically restraining a suspect.
See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that defendant was
seized when "he was tackled" by a police officer).
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In Mendenhall in 1980, Justice Stewart introduced the test used today
to identify a seizure accomplished by a show of authority (rather than
physical force). Stewart declared that such a seizure occurs if "in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."19 The standard is an
objective one, asking "not whether the citizen perceived that he was being
ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and
actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person."2 °  Justice
Stewart explained that since the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
seizures exists "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by
enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals,"
so long as "the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard
the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's
liberty or privacy. ' '2  The standard is meant to avoid imposing "wholly
unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement
22practices" by turning every investigation into an unconstitutional seizure.
Applying the free-to-leave standard to the facts of Mendenhall, the
Court determined that a woman approached and questioned by Drug
Enforcement Agency agents in the public concourse of an airport was not
seized.23 The Court noted that the agents wore no uniforms, displayed no
weapons, "requested" rather than demanded to see the woman's
identification, and asked her a few questions.24 The Court determined that
"nothing in the record suggests that the [woman] had any objective reason
to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and
proceed on her way.",
25
The Court repeatedly used the free-to-leave standard after
Mendenhall.26  For example, the Court in Royer found that a person
19 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
21 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628. Because the test is objective, "neither the subjective
intentions of the particular officer nor the subjective expectations of the particular suspect
are determinative." Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey:
Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 738.
21 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.




26 Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
46 (1996); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 (1991); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 600-01 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Michigan v. Chesternut,
486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) ("The Court has... embraced this test"); INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 214 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 516 n.l (1983). The test has been
widely used in the federal circuit courts as well. See, e.g., Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742,
747-48 (7th Cir. 2007) ("In order to establish that Deputy Marshal Norton's actions
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approached by narcotics agents in an airport had been seized. 7 The seizure
did not occur when the officers first approached and questioned Royer, as
similar officers had done in Mendenhall, but rather "when the officers
identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected
of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police
room, while retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicating
in any way that he was free to depart." 28 The Court believed this greater
show of authority would have made a reasonable person believe he was not
free to leave.29
In contrast, the Court did not find a seizure in Delgado, a case in
which Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents searching for
illegal workers questioned the entire work forces of two factories.3 °
Though INS agents were positioned at the exits to the factories and caused
"some disruption," the record indicated that the agents did not prevent
workers from moving about the factory. 31 The Court reasoned that "[i]f
mere questioning does not constitute a seizure when it occurs inside the
factory, it is no more a seizure when it occurs at the exits. ' 32 Finally, in
Michigan v. Chesternut, the Court concluded Chesternut was not seized
even though a police car followed him for a short distance and then drove
parallel to him as he ran.33 The Court believed the "brief acceleration to
catch up" and the "short drive alongside him" were not "so intimidating"
that respondent could reasonably believe "he was not free to disregard the
police presence and go about his business" as he continued walking.34
The Court in Chesternut added a further justification for its free-to-
leave test. Because the test focuses on what a reasonable man would
believe, it allows for "consistent application from one police encounter to
the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of
constituted a 'seizure,' the plaintiffs must demonstrate, from all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, that a reasonable person in such a situation would have believed
that he was not free to leave."); United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir.
2007) ("In sum.,, the mere asking of questions, including asking for permission to search
Washington's person, raised no Fourth Amendment issue so long as a reasonable person in.
Washington's situation would have felt free to leave.").
27 Royer, 460 U.S. at 502.
28 Id. at 501.
29 Id. at 502 ("These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such
that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave."' (quoting
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554)).
30 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
34 Id. at 576.
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the police. ' 35 This consistency allows the police to determine, in advance,
whether the contemplated conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment.36
As such, the Court believed the test had predictive power that was useful to
law enforcement.
In 1991, the Court expanded the free-to-leave standard to address
situations in which an individual had "no desire to leave" for reasons
unrelated to the police officer's action.37 In Bostick, the Court considered
the case of a man who was approached by a police officer while the man
was sitting on a Greyhound bus that had stopped in the middle of its
journey. 38 Explaining that a passenger in the middle of a trip would not feel
free to get up and leave the bus, the Court determined that the passenger
was not seized only if "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. ,39  The Court
declined to apply its expanded standard to the facts, however, remanding to
the trial court to apply the new standard to all the facts of the case. But the
Court noted its prior reasoning that merely approaching or questioning a
suspect did not constitute a seizure and emphasized that the officers did not• 4 0
point guns at Bostick or otherwise threaten him.
The Court reaffirmed its expanded free-to-leave standard in Drayton,1
addressing a stop on a bus similar to that in Bostick, and in Brendlin,
42
addressing the police stop of a car and its passengers. Unlike in Bostick, the
Drayton Court actually applied the facts to its standard and determined that
a seizure had not occurred: the officer did not brandish his weapon, left the
aisle free, and spoke in a "polite, quiet" voice,43 and the Court concluded
that "[n]othing [the officer] said would suggest to a reasonable person that
he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the
" Id. at 574.
36 id.
37 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
" Id. at 431-32.
39 Id. at 436. The Court also made clear that the reasonable person it had in mind was an
"innocent person," not a reasonable criminal. Id. at 438.
40 Id. at 434, 437.
41 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) ("The proper inquiry is whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
42 Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405-06 (2007) ("[W]hen a person has no
desire to leave for reasons unrelated to the police presence, the coercive effect of the
encounter can be measured better by asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter .... (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
43 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-04.
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encounter." 4 The Brendlin Court, on the other hand, did find a seizure. It
held that not only the driver but also the passengers of a car stopped by the
police were seized.45 The Court explained that everyone in the car would
have recognized that "no one in the car was free to depart without police
permission.,
46
In using this standard for seizure, the Court has provided numerous
examples of situations in which a person is not seized. Although "for the
most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment
context, ' 47 there are certain classes of encounters with the police that the
Court seems to believe never to constitute a seizure. A citizen on the street
"or in another public place ' 48 who is approached by a police officer and
asked questions by that officer is not seized.49 There is also no seizure
when officers identify themselves as police officers, 50 ask for a person's
identification, or ask to search his baggage. Even when that questioning
takes place in a more contained environment, such as on a bus where an
officer stands in the doorway,5" in a factory where officers wait at the
exits, 52 or on the street as a police car drives next to a person as he walks,
53
the Court has held that a seizure does not occur without more police action
than mere questioning.
To find a seizure based on a "show of authority," the Court requires
more evidence of coercion than the mere presence and speech of law
enforcement officers.54  That evidence can include "the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone
44 Id. at 204.
45 Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2410 ("Brendlin[, the passenger,] was seized from the moment
Simeroth's[, the driver,] car came to a halt on the side of the road .....
46 Id. at 2407.
47 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.
48 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); see, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that such interactions in airports are "the sort of consensual
encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth Amendment interest").
49 See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) ("We have held repeatedly that
mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]here is nothing in the
Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the
streets.").
50 Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
51 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 210.
52 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984).
53 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
54 Cf Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212
(2002) ("Only if the police behave with some extreme degree of coercion beyond that
inherent in the police-citizen confrontation will a court vitiate the consent [to search].").
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of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled."5' Both the Bostick and Drayton Courts specifically noted that
the officers did not brandish their weapons or make threats-the type of
coercion that might constitute a seizure. The coercion in Royer came from
the police identifying Royer as a suspect and retaining his identification and
ticket. Coercion is most clear in Brendlin, as the Court explained, since no
person would feel that he could simply drive away from a police stop
without being pursued by the officer. 6
As these cases demonstrate, the Court has consistently applied its
seizure standard since first introducing that standard in 1980. The Court
has declined to find seizures based on mere interaction with law
enforcement without a showing of some degree of outward coercion, such
as verbal threats or the presence of weapons. The Court has firmly held
that, absent that kind of coercion, a reasonable person would feel free to
leave or otherwise terminate his encounters with law enforcement officers.
B. LIMITED EXISTING EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT PEOPLE DO NOT
FEEL FREE TO LEAVE IN MANY MORE SITUATIONS THAN THE
COURT BELIEVES
In developing its standard for determining when a person is seized, the
Supreme Court has relied on its own beliefs about how the reasonable
person would feel.57 While determining the knowledge and feelings of the
reasonable person is a mainstay of many of the Court's doctrines, 58 both
commentators5 9 and the Court60 itself have noted that empirical evidence
55 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980).
56 See Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2007).
57 Nadler, supra note 9, at 166-67 (2002) ("[T]he Court assumed these questions can be
answered from intuition alone."); see also Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still
Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND.
L.J. 773, 800-01 (2005) ("The most frequent criticism of the consent search cases is that the
Supreme Court is unaware of the realities on the street ....").
58 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615-16 (2004) ("[S]ince a reasonable
person in the suspect's shoes could have seen the station house questioning as a new and
distinct experience, the Miranda warnings could have made sense as presenting a genuine
choice whether to follow up on the earlier admission.").
59 See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 9, at 167 ("[Tlhese are questions that depend crucially on
empirical inquiries .... [R]elying on casual intuition to infer why someone acted the way
they did in a situation where all of the details and circumstances are important and must be
taken into account (as the Court has emphasized repeatedly) almost always leads to mistaken
and erroneous judgments."); see also Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. R v. 4, 56 (1998) ("To begin, the Court could rely to a greater
extent on empirical and policy analysis in its written opinions.").
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would be helpful in resolving seizure questions. Almost no empirical
evidence exists, however, showing when a person would feel free to leave
an encounter with the police.6' There is limited empirical evidence, both
directly from analysis of data and indirectly from psychological studies, on
a related question: when do people voluntarily consent to searches by the
police? If an average person would not feel free to decline a police officer's
search request, it is also likely that an average person would not feel free to
leave an encounter with those same police officers.
One study directly addresses whether people voluntarily, or freely,
consent to police requests to conduct searches of those people's
automobiles, and it concludes that people do not feel free to say no to the
police.62 That study examined the rate at which people in Ohio consented
to a search request from the Ohio Highway Patrol during a traffic stop.
63
The study revealed that motorists consented to a search of their cars 88.5%
of the time.64 The police found drugs in approximately 12.9% of the
searches conducted with the driver's consent,65 a result reminiscent of
Bostick and Drayton, in which passengers consented to searches even
though they were carrying drugs. This finding suggests that the consent to
search was not freely given, either because people did not know they could
refuse or because they knew, but still did not feel free to do so.
66
60 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 43-44, Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 06-
8120) (noting the lack of "studies" concerning whether people feel free to leave during
encounters with police).
61 See Burkoff, supra note 9, at 1119-20 (discussing an undergraduate thesis that asked
whether people would feel free to leave once they had declined a police request to search a
car); Nadler, supra note 9, at 201 (noting the absence of studies on this question); cf Daniel
L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 188
(1991) ("Empirical studies [on consent searches) are either nonexistent or inconclusive.").
62 Burkoff also refers to "anecdotal" evidence from an unpublished undergraduate thesis.
Burkoff, supra note 9, at 1119-20.
63 lllya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the "Voluntary"
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 366 (2001).
64 Id. at 367. The study found that the rate of consent actually went up slightly once the
police began using the warning. Id. But there is no discussion in Lichtenberg's article about
whether this difference is statistically significant, and the difference may have been caused
by an overly sensitive dependent variable.
65 Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing
Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REv. 399, 452 (2004)
(discussing data from Lichtenberg's study available in Lichtenberg's doctoral dissertation,
but not published in the final article).
66 Simmons, supra note 57, at 774 ("[N]o outsider viewing the interaction would
conclude that the defendants voluntarily consented to a search when surrounded by police at
close quarters, especially if the defendants knew (as they must have) that giving the consent
would ultimately result in serious criminal charges being filed against them.").
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Along with this limited direct data, there is a wealth of evidence from
psychological studies suggesting that people rarely comply freely with
requests from police officers.67 As one commentator explained, "the extent
to which we feel free to refuse to comply under situationally induced
pressures to do so is extremely limited. 6 8  Those situationally induced
pressure are particularly strong in the seizure context.
The first finding in this psychological literature is that people feel
compelled to comply with authority figures.69  This finding is primarily
supported by studies conducted by Stanley Milgram and Leonard Bickman.
In Milgram's studies, the experimental subject was asked by an
experimenter, dressed in a lab coat, to deliver electric shocks to another
person in another room.70 The shocks were administered whenever the
second person committed errors. 71  Unknown to the subject, both the
experimenter and the person in the other room, whom the subject could hear
but not see, were actors, and the person in the other room was not shocked.
The shockers believed they were administering "severe" shocks to the
72person in the other room and could hear that person scream. Despite
showing great concern for the person receiving shocks, the subjects
continued to comply with the experimenter and administer more shocks
when told by the experimenter that "[t]he experiment requires that you
continue .... You have no choice; you must go on.",73 Sixty-five percent
67 For a thorough review of this literature, see Nadler, supra note 9. Cf Simmons, supra
note 57, at 801 ("[A] few legal scholars have applied various psychological experiments to
the question of consent searches, and without exception they have concluded that the studies
provide evidence that most of the 'consents' approved of by the Supreme Court are in fact
involuntary.").
68 Nadler, supra note 9, at 173.
69 The Court itself has recognized the power of psychological pressure to compel people
to act in ways they would not otherwise act. For example, the Court recognized that students
who listened to the reading of a prayer at a graduation ceremony might feel compelled to
accept the religious messages even if they did not want to do so. See Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 588 (1992). Justice Kennedy wrote that the role of authority-the school
district-in establishing the prayer "places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence .... This
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion." Id. at 594.
70 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974);
see also Chanenson, supra note 65, at 448-50 (2004); Nadler, supra note 9, at 175-77
(discussing MILGRAM, supra); Simmons, supra note 57, at 802-08 (discussing MILGRAM,
supra).
71 Simmons, supra note 57, at 802-08.
72 Nadler, supra note 9, at 176.
" Id. at 175-76.
[Vol. 99
FREE TO LEA VE? AN EMPIRICAL LOOK
of the subjects administered the maximum possible "shock" in the
74experiment.
Bickman's experiments also suggested that people comply with
requests from authority figures.75 In those experiments, an experimenter
stood on the street dressed as a civilian, a milkman, or an unarmed security
guard.76 The experimenter told passing people to perform a variety of tasks,
such as picking up a bag from the ground." Requests made by the security
guard increased compliance rates between thirty-six and fifty-six percentage
points relative to the rates generated when the experimenter dressed as a
civilian.78 A later replication of Bickman's study using an experimenter in
a fireman's uniform instead of a security guard produced similarly greater
levels of compliance relative to an experimenter in civilian clothes.7 9
There are limitations on how much light Milgram's and Bickman's
work sheds on the seizure question.80 Neither set of experiments actually
involved a police officer, and both sets of authority figures commanded,
rather than asked, subjects to comply. Elements of the experiment may
have made compliance more likely than in other situations involving
authority figures.81 Later studies have also shown that other factors, such as
whether the subject sees another person refuse to comply, reduce the
likelihood that the subject himself will comply.8 2 However, none of these
74 Martha Minow, Living Up To Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive
Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence, 52 McGILL L.J. 1, 32 (2007).
75 Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47
(1974).
76 Simmons, supra note 57, at 808.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Brad J. Bushman, Perceived Symbols ofAuthority and Their Influence on Compliance,
14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 501, 502-06 (1984); Simmons, supra note 57, at 809 n.191
(discussing Bushman's experiment).
80 Chanenson, supra note 65, at 449 ("Yet, it is not reasonable to rely on the studies as
full and direct support for attacking the voluntariness of all consent searches."); cf Simmons,
supra note 57, at 807 ("In summary, Milgram's experiments are not very useful in helping us
assign the appropriate level of police pressure in the context of consent searches. Many of
those that obeyed protested vigorously; all did so knowing full well the results of their
actions.").
81 Minow, supra note 74, at 32; Moti Nissani, Comment, A Cognitive Reinterpretation of
Stanley Milgram's Observations on Obedience to Authority, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 1384, 1384
(1990).
82 See, e.g., David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in
the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2362 (1992) ("Milgram discovered that
compliance was extraordinarily sensitive to peer pressure. When the other team members
refused to proceed with the experiment, only ten percent of the subjects remained obedient to
the experimenter and 'went all the way.' Conversely, when a teammate rather than the
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limitations refutes the underlying point of these psychological studies:
people feel compelled to comply with authority figures. This observation
holds true even in situations where the subjects believe they are causing
harm, as in Milgram's experiment, or where they have no independent
reason to comply, as in Bickman's experiment.
Other sets of experiments have revealed contingencies that suggest
people do not feel free when dealing with police officers. For example,
close proximity to authority figures creates "discomfort, anxiety, and
83tension," which makes people more likely to acquiesce to their requests.
In addition, the requirement that consent decisions be made quickly may
reduce the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Research suggests
that people answering questions with objectively correct answers commit
more errors when under time pressure. Furthermore, people making
decisions under time pressure "end their decision process prior to
considering all the relevant information and alternatives. 84 The individual
responses of motorists in a study of those stopped by the Ohio Highway
Patrol support the conclusion that these psychological forces make freely-
given consent difficult and unlikely. 5 Those motorists identified the
feelings of pressure from authority that this psychological research suggests
would exist.
8 6
None of the evidence reviewed above directly addresses whether or not
citizens actually "feel free to leave" in situations where the Supreme Court
believes that they should. The evidence suggests that people confronted by
police officers do not act as freely as the Court believes.
C. WHETHER KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AN ENCOUNTER
WITH THE POLICE MAKES PEOPLE MORE LIKELY TO FEEL FREE TO
LEAVE THOSE ENCOUNTERS IS UNCLEAR
Whether a person's knowledge of his right to decline a police officer's
request increases the person's feeling of freedom to do so is widely debated.
Some scholars who believe that knowledge of one's right to decline
subject took charge of physically administering the shock, 92.5% of the subjects went along
with the experiment up to the maximum shock.").
83 Nadler, supra note 9, at 193 ("In sum, people approached at a close distance by an
authority in a tightly enclosed space with no opportunity to move further away or leave feel
discomfort and tension; at the same time, people who find their space invaded in this manner
are more willing to comply with the request of the person making them feel
uncomfortable.").
84 Id. at 194.
85 See Lichtenberg, supra note 63.
86 Some of the people who consented to the search gave answers such as: "I knew legally
I didn't have to, but I kind of felt that I had to" or "I felt a little pressured that I didn't have
much choice." Nadler, supra note 9, at 202-03 (citing Lichtenberg, supra note 63).
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increases freedom to do so have suggested that the police be required to
give Miranda-like warnings that people are free to leave or decline their
requests.87 The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected that position.88
Other scholars have argued that warnings will have little effect because
knowledge of one's rights will not make one more likely to refuse
consent.89  Though the debate has focused primarily not on seizures
themselves but on consent searches, the standards for whether a person is
seized and for whether a person voluntarily consents to a search are quite
similar,90 and the arguments about knowledge in the consent search debate
apply to the seizure context as well.
A number of scholars have called for the police to administer
Miranda-like warnings before requesting anything at all of an individual.
Some of those scholars contend that knowledge of one's rights is a
necessary precondition for any sort of voluntary consent.91 Others argue
that the benefits of informed consent, including greater protection of
individual dignity92 or privacy, greatly outweigh the costs to law
enforcement.93 At least one judge agrees.94 Still others have argued that a
87 See infra notes 91-97.
88 See infra notes 98-105.
89 See infra notes 106-10.
90 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 57, at 782-83 (arguing that the two tests are really the
same).
91 See, e.g., Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TuL. L. REv. 1409, 1466 (2000)
("Consent to lawful authority therefore does not necessarily evince a willingness to have the
personal property in one's car thoroughly inspected. Absent knowledge of the right to
withhold consent, a suspect is left with the belief that he has no choice.").
92 See Alan C. Michaels, Rights Knowledge: Values and Tradeoffs, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1355, 1379 (2007) ("To the extent one believes the right is designed to protect individual
dignitary interests, greater knowledge of the right would provide some further protection to
individual autonomy .... ).
93 See, e.g., id.; Loewy, supra note 11, at 554 ("The Court's suggestion that such [a
warning] would destroy the informality of the interchange and be thoroughly impractical is
so palpably false as to be laughable. A simple 'I'd like you to let me search your car Joe, but
you don't have to' would add to the informality, while minimizing the show of force.");
Simmons, supra note 57, at 821 ("The Supreme Court has shown concern that a notification
would be an 'unrealistic' burden to put on law enforcement and would be 'thoroughly
impractical;' but if the notification was brief enough, these concerns seem
unjustified .... Thus, there would be no harm and perhaps a bit of good in requiring a brief
notification of a suspect's rights before a law enforcement officer can request consent.");
Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv.
215, 244-47 (arguing that the costs to law enforcement of a warning requirement would be
small); Rebecca A. Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving Content to the Concept of
Free and Voluntary Consent, 77 VA. L. REV. 183, 206 (1991) ("[A]ll that is required for an
effective warning are the six small words, 'You have the right to refuse,' appended to each
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warning would help to reduce the greater coercion felt by minorities or by
the poor when interacting with the police. 95 A final group of commentators
suggests that warnings are a necessary, but not sufficient, part of a larger
solution.96
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the possibility of such
warnings.97 The Court has based its rejection on its belief that the ability of
a person to consent freely should be evaluated by a totality of the
circumstances test in order to balance the citizen's rights against the needs
of the police and society to obtain information and conduct investigations.98
In Schneckloth, the Court established the rule that one can "voluntarily"
consent to a search even if one does not know one has the right to refuse. 99
The Court argued that because voluntariness is "a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances[,]" knowledge of
rights is one factor in the mix; knowledge does not determine the issue.'0°
In Robinette,10 1 the Court extended to the free-to-leave standard its belief
request for consent to search a suitcase. The gains in fairness to suspects far outweigh
whatever minute losses in law enforcement efficacy such a warning may cause.").
94 Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRAM. L. 233, 245
(2007) ("I believe it would be an equally good thing if similar words accompanied police
requests for consent to search. . . . Such a rule, like its Miranda parallel in custodial
interrogation, would probably reduce the number of consents obtained, but most likely not
by much.").
95 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REv.
946, 1030 (2002) (arguing that warnings about the right to refuse consent may help to
counteract the greater coercion some races feel when interacting with the police); Carol S.
Steiker, How Much Justice Can You Afford? A Response to Stuntz, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1290, 1294 (1999) ("Requiring police officers, when seeking consent to search, to advise all
suspects of their right to refuse to consent would help to close the information and power gap
currently existing between the rich and poor in their encounters with law enforcement
agents.").
96 See, e.g., Chanenson, supra note 65, at 465 (arguing that warnings alone are not
enough).
97 For a discussion of potential political reasons why the Court has not adopted this
position, see Lynch, supra note 94.
98 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 231 (1973) (arguing that "valid
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence" and that "it
would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed
requirements of an effective warning"); see also Loewy, supra note 11, at 554 (arguing that
a warning requirement would "[o]f course ... decrease the number of consent searches").
99 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. But see id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I would
have thought that the capacity to [consent to the police] necessarily depends upon knowledge
that there is a choice to be made.").
100 Id. at 227 ("While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent.").
101 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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that ignorance of one's right does not impair the ability to choose freely.
The Robinette Court held that a police officer does not need to inform
someone that he or she has stopped that the person is free to go.'°2 The
Court's primary concern during its brief discussion 0 3 of the issue was the
impracticability of imposing such a requirement on police, rather than the
effect such a warning might have on the person stopped by the officer.
104
Several articles have taken a middle position, suggesting that while
informed consent is desirable in principle, it would have little actual effect
on the rate of consent in interactions with the police. One author argues
that warnings are not a "panacea" and might do little to reduce coercion;
10 5
the warnings would still come in the context of a coercive encounter, and
many people believe police officers routinely ignore or violate rules,
increasing the likelihood that the opportunity to decline a request is not a
real one. 10 6  Others have expressed a similar concern that the overall
coerciveness of the encounter would make requiring warnings ineffective-
almost as many people would consent even if warned.107 The Ohio
Highway Patrol study also examined the rate at which people consented to
search after the police began giving a Miranda-like warning informing
motorists that they were not required to consent to a search.'0° The study
found that the rate of consent actually went up slightly, suggesting that the
warning did not make people feel more free to decline the request. 109 These
articles thus argue that even informed consent would likely be coerced
consent.
102 See id. at 39-40 ("[It would] be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.").
103 Chief Justice Rehnquist devoted only two paragraphs to consideration of the potential
need for informed consent. See id.
104 See id.
105 Strauss, supra note 54, at 254.
106 Id.
107 Susan R. Klein, Lies, Omissions, and Concealment: The Golden Rule in Law
Enforcement and the Federal Criminal Code, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2007)
("Thus, the Court may be incorrect in its prediction that knowledge about rights will lead to
the exercise of these rights, along with the negative effects on crime clearance."); Michaels,
supra note 92, at 1380 ("The best guess here, though, is that the effect [of a warning] would,
in any event, be minimal."); Nadler, supra note 9, at 205 ("Given the magnitude of
situational pressures brought to bear on citizens in bus sweeps and similar situations, there is
no reason to think that police advising citizens that they have a right not to cooperate with
their request for consent to search will significantly reduce coercion experienced by citizens
in this situation."). But see Loewy, supra note 11, at 554 (arguing that a warning
requirement would "[o]f course.., decrease the number of consent searches").
107 Robinette, 519 U.S. 33.
108 See Lichtenberg, supra note 63, at 367 (explaining that the percentage of people





This Part outlines the methodology used to gather concrete evidence to
test the Court's use of its seizure standard. I collected data from a random
sample of adults to determine how free they would feel to walk away from a
police officer who asked them questions on the sidewalk or while they were
riding a bus. I used a one-page, written questionnaire, distributed in four
locations in Boston on four different dates in December 2007 and January
2008. This Part explains how the surveying was conducted, how the
questionnaire was designed, and how the data were analyzed. Finally, it
discusses potential sources of bias that these design and implementation
choices might have created.
A. SURVEY PROCEDURE
In each location, the questionnaires were presented by teams of two or
three Harvard Law School students.1 The surveyors were trained to use a
standard prompt to ask people if they wanted to participate111 and a standard
response 112 to explain what the survey was about if people asked. 1 3
Surveyors were trained to let the respondents circle or write their own
answers; surveyors were to provide help only by saying that "there are no
right answers" and that the respondent should "select whatever answer he
thought made the most sense to him." Finally, surveyors were trained to
track the number of people who declined to complete a survey or who did
not respond in any way when asked, but they did not track the age, race, or
gender of those who declined. Surveyors were warned to avoid favoring
any particular demographic.' 14 Instead, they were asked simply to talk to
everyone in the area, including both individuals and groups of people.
110 Eight students conducted surveys. All but one of the students were white and four
were female. All the students were paid at an hourly rate through a grant from Harvard Law
School.
11l "Would you like to complete a one-minute, anonymous survey for Harvard Law
School?"
112 "How people interact with the police."
113 To test whether or not survey-takers might provide biased results by guessing the real
purpose of the survey, I tested a draft questionnaire on a group of Harvard Law School first-
year students who had not yet taken criminal procedure or studied the Fourth Amendment.
Even among that relatively knowledgeable group, only nine out of sixty-five respondents, or
13%, believed the survey was meant to explore a search-and-seizure topic.
114 Surveyors did not use a truly random method, such as selecting every fifth person
who walked past a reference point. It is unlikely, therefore, that the survey group was truly
randomly selected. As the demographic data suggest, however, the sample did not seem
skewed in any particular direction. See infra Part IV.A.
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After being tested,115 the questionnaire was administered in four
locations in the greater Boston area: Faneuil Hall / Quincy Market, the rail
terminal in South Station, Porter Square, and the Government Center
subway station / North Station rail terminal. These locations were selected
to provide variety in the likely socioeconomic background of people
present.1 16 In each location, a single surveyor approached both individual
people and groups (surveyors did not work in teams). Respondents were
responsible for filling in the answers themselves while the surveyor stood to
the side.' 17 Respondents were not paid to participate in or to complete the
survey.
B. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
The one-page written questionnaire had three parts." 8 The first part
presented two scenarios--encounters between a civilian and police officer
on a sidewalk and on a bus. The short prompts aimed to maximize the
number of people who would be willing (and able) to read and complete the
survey in a short period of time." 9 Respondents indicated how free they
would feel to leave such a situation on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 meant
"not free to leave or say no" and 5 meant "completely free to leave or say
no.'' 2 ° I will refer to this scale throughout the Article as the "free to leave
scale" or "freedom to leave scale."
115 Before it was used in the field, the questionnaire was tested on sixty-five Harvard
Law School first-year students to ensure that it could be completed quickly and without
confusion. See NORMAN M. BRADBURN, SEYMOUR SUDMAN & BRIAN WANSINK, ASKING
QUESTIONS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 319 (Rev. ed. 2004)
(explaining that pilot tests need not be conducted with a sample identical to the one targeted
in the actual surveying). The pre-test indicated that the survey needed no significant
changes. See note 113, supra (describing pilot test).
116 The average person shopping in Quincy Market, for instance, is likely to be of a
different background than the average person shopping at the supermarket in Porter Square.
Three of the locations, Quincy Market and the two train stations, were likely to over-sample
wealthier people, either shoppers or commuters returning to Boston's suburbs.
117 Having respondents complete the survey themselves reduces, if not eliminates, bias
that might have been attributable to differences in surveyors. See ROGER TOURANGEAU,
LANCE J. RipS & KENNETH RASINSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SURVEY RESPONSE 298 (2000). In
addition, respondents' self-administration of the survey reduced concern that respondents
would mischaracterize how free they felt to leave a situation as a result of embarrassment.
See id. at 306.
118 See infra app. A.
119 Respondents were told, "Assume you do not want to talk to the officer," because the
purpose of the survey was not to see whether people are generally helpful and cooperative
with the police, but rather to explore the more legally significant question of whether people
feel they must cooperate with the police even when they do not want to do so.
120 See infra app. A. Continuous scales with between four and six options are used
widely in surveys. KEITH F. PUNCH, SURVEY RESEARCH: THE BASICS 59 (2003). While the
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The second part of the questionnaire consisted of one question and
asked the respondent to indicate which of four options best described his
legal rights in the encounter with the police officer. 121 The answers were
ordered from greatest obligation to the police to least obligation. 22 The
doctrinally "correct" answer was the fourth choice, 23 but it is worth noting
that the third choice may be the most correct expression of reality. 124 Note
also that respondents could provide, by circling a number, only one answer
to the question even though the question seems to ask for two different
answers (an answer for question one, regarding the sidewalk hypothetical,
and an answer for question two, regarding the bus hypothetical). 125  That
survey might have been even more effective had the two ends of the scale been evenly
balanced, the survey results all fall below the "somewhat free to leave" middle position,
reducing any concern about imbalance.
121 See infra app. A.
122 Placing the "correct" answer, number four, at one extreme might have prompted
people who were unsure about whether number three or number four was correct to select
number three, inflating the number of people who seemed not to know their rights in the
seizure situation. See HOWARD SCHUMAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN
ATTITUDE SURVEYS: EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT 162-69
(1981) (discussing the tendency of people to discriminate against options at the extreme ends
of a list). But someone who is unsure, for purposes of this study, is just like someone who is
sure but wrong-neither person knows his rights.
123 The correct answer read: "You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer
with no consequence to yourself." See infra app. A. No one is forced to comply with a
police officer's request for questions. As the Court has explained, "[t]he person
approached... need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to
the questions at all and may go on his way." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).
In addition, "refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
125 (2000) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)); see Steinbock, supra note
9, at 530 ("Unless a police officer has 'probable cause' to make an arrest or a 'reasonable
suspicion' to conduct a 'stop and frisk', a person has the legal right to walk away from a
police officer." (quoting PAUL BERGMAN & SARA J. BERMAN-BARRETT, THE CRIMINAL LAW
HANDBOOK (3d ed. 2000)). Of course, doing more than merely refusing to cooperate might
create such a justification. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (explaining that "unprovoked flight...
[or] nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion").
124 The third option read: "You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may
assume you are guilty of wrongdoing if you do." See infra app. A. There is some concern
that the Court's decision in Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, will open the door to allowing police to
use refusal or retraction of consent as the source of probable cause. See Chanenson, supra
note 65, at 416-32; see also Steinbock, supra note 9, at 543 (suggesting that good practice
for a person walking away from the police is to "walk-do not run or otherwise seem to be
'evading' the police"); cf WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.2() (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting that "the suspect's earlier refusal to
give consent is a factor which is properly taken into account [in] the 'totality of the
circumstances' in judging the later consent under the Schneckloth formula" for determining
whether consent is voluntary).
125 See infra app. A.
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ambiguity should not affect the results.12 6 The third part of the survey
gathered demographic information. 127 Respondents filled in their ages and
zip codes,1 28 as well as a yes or no in response to the question, "Have you
ever been stopped before by a police officer?" 129 After taking the survey
back, the surveyors themselves recorded the gender and race of the
respondents in two sets of boxes at the bottom of the page.
1 30
C. DATA CODING
The data from the surveys were coded following a standard procedure.
In some cases, respondents' answers to the first two questions were unclear.
Because the numbers were listed horizontally, with space in between them,
some respondents marked an area in between two numbers-indicating, for
example, a 3.5. When this happened, I selected the whole number to which
the mark seemed closer; whenever the mark was near the middle of the
range, I rounded up in the more free to leave direction.13 1 The results for
each respondent who told the surveyor that he or she was not from the
United States or was a police officer were dropped, as were any surveys in
126 This defect in the question is unlikely to have caused problems. If we think that
people believe the law is the same regardless of location, there is no problem. If we believe
that people feel their rights differ by location, there is still little cause for concern. Since the
actual right does not vary by location, at least one of the two answers given in each case
would have been incorrect, and therefore, the overall answer for that respondent would also
have been incorrect. Thus, at minimum, the wording of this question has no effect on the
number of people who got the answer "right"; at maximum, the wording causes the data to
understate respondents' legal ignorance.
127 See BRADBURN, SUDMAN & WANSINK, supra note 115, at 262 ("Demographic
questions are almost always asked at the end of an interview, after the substantive
questions.").
128 Zip codes were later used as proxies for income, although it is unclear whether zip
codes are an effective proxy for individual incomes. See, e.g., Kathryn Moss et al.,
Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1,
86 (2001) (discussing problems with using zip codes as proxies for income); Margaret F.
Brinig, Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 1, 14 n.56 (1995) (discussing a similar problem).
129 This question was written without enough specificity to ensure consistent results.
Some respondents believed the question included traffic stops, such as being pulled over for
a red light, while others believed it only included situations like the ones mentioned in the
first part of the survey, Thus the analysis of the survey does not include these results.
130 See infra app. A. The two boxes on the lower left of the survey were to indicate male
and female respectively, and the three boxes in the center corresponded to White, Black, and
Other.
131 Only twenty-seven questionnaires, or 6.6% of responses, fell into this category. Even
if all those questionnaires were dropped from the sample, the results discussed below would
remain statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude.
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which the results were illegible. These dropped surveys were counted 32 in
the denominator for response rates, but not in the numerator, in order to
provide a conservative response rate.
D. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF BIAS
The methodological choices in this survey raise several concerns about
bias. First, Boston may not be representative of the country as a whole.
While there is no reason to believe that such a systematic bias would exist
that the results would be wholly inapplicable to the rest of the country, only
future surveys can reveal whatever regional differences exist. Second, there
will be a sample selection bias since the approach described above is likely
to over-represent certain groups, particularly people who are white, who
work, and who live in the suburbs surrounding Boston rather than in the
urban center. The survey locations, especially the two commuter rail
stations and the upscale mall, likely featured higher concentrations of those
demographics. The surveyors themselves, almost all white and almost all
wearing clothing with the Harvard Law School (HLS) insignia, are also
likely to have over-selected wealthier, whiter respondents and been more
likely to get those groups of people to stop in the first place. While it would
have been difficult to eliminate these demographic biases, there is reason to
believe, as I discuss below, that they do not undermine the conclusions of
this Article.
133
Finally, there will also be a response bias based on who chose to fill
out the questionnaire, but it is unclear in which direction that bias would
operate. The people who would be likely to stop to complete a survey
might be the types of people who feel less free to terminate their encounters
with the police. That is, they might be the type of people who generally
feel more compelled to do what other people ask them to do. In that case,
the results would understate the degree to which the average person would
feel free to leave. However, the surveyors made it clear that people were
not required to fill out the survey. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that
the situational forces surrounding a law student's request to complete a
survey are similar enough to a police officer's request to answer questions
that the sample, consisting of people who are willing to stop for the law
student, would be significantly skewed. On the other hand, if the people
who stopped to talk to the mostly white surveyors were disproportionately
white, high income, and educated, the sample would likely over-represent
132 There were eighteen surveys in this category.
133 No specific demographic or racial group had an average freedom-to-leave score that
was far different from the overall sample average. Even if the surveyors over-selected for
young respondents, for instance, the results would not be very different. See infra text
accompanying note 158.
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exactly the kind of people who might be more likely to feel free to leave. In
that case, these results would overstate the degree to which the average
person feels free to leave. It will not be possible to determine the effects of
this selection bias until subsequent research explores similar questions in
other populations.
IV. RESULTS
There are three main findings. The data show that most people would
not feel free to leave when they are questioned by a police officer on the
street or on a bus. Some groups of respondents, women and people under
twenty-five, would feel even less free to leave than the average. Even those
people who know that they have a right to leave responded that they would
not feel free to leave. There were no statistically significant differences
between respondents of different races, different income levels, or those
who had different experiences with the police. 134 This Part first reviews the
demographics of the sample, and then presents those three main findings.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS
The data in this Article come from 406 survey responses. 35  The
response rate was 36.6%.136 The vast majority of respondents completed
the entire survey.1 37 The average age of respondents was 36.9 years old, the
youngest respondent was fifteen and the oldest respondent was eighty-five.
Compared to the general population in Boston, this sample is roughly
representative in terms of gender and people over the age of sixty-five (see
Table 1). The sample over-represents people under twenty-five' 3t and
134 Income was measured using the median household income for each zip code from the
2000 U.S. Census. These results only suggest that no differences existed in this sample, and
not that there are no differences between the groups in the actual world. More accurate
measures of race and income, coupled with more diversity in the sample, might reveal
differences. The question about previous stops by the police did not produce useable data.
See supra note 129.
135 The responses break down as follows: 93 responses from Faneuil Hall, 168 at South
Station, 78 at Porter Square, and 67 at Government Center / North Station.
136 Surveyors offered the questionnaire to a total of 1108 people. Four hundred and
twenty-four people completed questionnaires, but eighteen results were discarded and
counted as non-responses. See supra note 132. The response rate varied by survey site:
30.4% at Faneuil Hall, 65.2% at South Station, 19.2% at Porter Square, and 54.9% at
Government Center / North Station. The higher response rates at the two train stations were
likely the result of people having very little else to do while waiting for their trains.
137 All 406 respondents provided answers for both scenarios. Ten respondents did not
provide a zip code, five did not provide an age, and two did not respond to the knowledge-
of-rights question.
138 The larger-than-average number of people younger than twenty-five did not skew the
data. See infra note 157.
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under-represents non-white respondents, a result that might either be a
function of the manner in which race was recorded or a function of the
survey locations. When compared to the Boston suburbs or to the U.S.
population as a whole (see Table 1), the sample is representative in terms of
both gender and race, but still over-samples individuals under twenty-five
years of age. 
139
Table 1
Demographic breakdown of survey sample and comparative populations
Sample Boston 140  Boston Suburb U.S. (over
(Norfolk) 
141 18)142
% Female 52.0 51.9 51.9 51.7
% White 77.7 54.5 86.3 75.1
% > Age 65 10.0 10.4 13.9 12.4
% Age 15-24 26.7 N/A N/A 13.9
B. PEOPLE WOULD NOT FEEL FREE TO LEAVE
Respondents reported that they would not feel free to leave in either
the sidewalk or the bus scenario. 143 The sample had an average free-to-
leave score of 2.61 for the sidewalk scenario and 2.52 for the bus. 144 Those
139 Assuming the coding for race was accurate, this result makes sense. Two of the four
locations were commuter rail terminals; therefore, the sample likely consisted of many
people who lived outside of Boston.
140 U.S. Census Bureau, Boston (City) QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25/2507000.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
141 U.S. Census Bureau, Norfolk County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/25/25021.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2009).
142 U.S. Census Bureau, DP-1 Profile of General Demographic Characteristics for the
United States: 2000 http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?-bni=y&-geo id=01000
US&-qr..name=DEC_2000_SFI_U_DPI&-ds.name=DEC_2000_SFIU (last visited Jan.
7, 2009).
143 There is a difference between how respondents believe they would feel and how they
would actually feel. However, as discussed above, there is little reason to believe that
respondents are overstating how free they would feel. See infra text accompanying note 159.
144 All 406 respondents answered both of these questions. While the averages at the four
survey locations varied, the differences between averages for the sidewalk scenario were not
statistically significant, and the differences for the bus scenario were different only at the ten
percent level. The bus averages ranged from 2.81 to 2.39, but if each location had been
weighted equally, the average freedom to leave would have been 2.55, reflecting almost no
different from the sample average. There was also no statistically significant difference
between the overall average for the sidewalk and bus scenarios. The absence of a
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averages are below even the mid-point of the free-to-leave scale in the
survey, meaning respondents did not even feel "somewhat free to leave."
Those averages do not hide an underlying pattern of results that might
suggest an overstatement of the degree to which people do not feel free. As
the distribution of responses in both scenarios (Figure 1) shows, about half
of the sample selected 1 or 2,145 and almost 80% selected 3 or less.
146
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C. WOMEN AND PEOPLE UNDER TWENTY-FIVE FEEL RELATIVELY
LESS FREE TO LEAVE ENCOUNTERS WITH THE POLICE
Although respondents in general reported that they would not feel free
to leave, both women and people under the age of twenty-five 147 reported
that they would feel less free to leave than did men and people over the age
of twenty-five. The average freedom-to-leave score for men was 2.77 for
the sidewalk and 2.76 for the bus, while the averages for women were 2.45
and 2.30 (Table 2).148 As Figures 2 and 3 show, women were also more
statistically significant difference may suggest that the primary cause for feeling a lack of
freedom is not the particular circumstances of an event, but rather the presence of the police
officer. This result supports what commentators who have discussed the general coercive
power of authority figures have said. See supra Part II.C.
145 49.7% and 54.7%, respectively.
146 78.0% and 78.8%, respectively.
147 The Census reports data in groups of ten years for people aged "25" and older,
making "under 25" a natural category with which to capture high school students and college
students. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 142.
148 Three hundred ninety-two of 406 respondents were coded for gender. The differences
between men and women are statistically significant at the 1% level. While the overall
difference in the sample between genders was strongly significant, the differences between
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likely to select 1, meaning "not free to leave," whereas men were more
likely to select 5, meaning "completely free to leave.' 49  The average
freedom-to-leave score for respondents under twenty-five was 2.41 and
2.26, while the averages for respondents over twenty-five were 2.65 and
2.58 (Table 3).
Table 2




52% of the sample were women
Difference between columns significant at the 1% level
Table 3
Average "Free to Leave" Scores by Age
Under 25
t  25 and older
Sidewalk 2.41 2.65"
Bus 2.26 2.58
*26.7.0% of the sample were under age 25
Difference between columns significant at the 10% level
.** Difference between columns significant at the 1% level
genders were not significant at three of the four survey locations. While some randomness is
to be expected in sub-samples-which is the very reason one draws from multiple sub-
samples-there is no reason to believe that there is an interaction effect between location and
gender.
149 The difference in these distributions is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 2: Effect of Gender on Freedom to Leave
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These results indicate that certain groups feel the coercive pressure of
police encounters more than others do. Several articles have suggested that
the poor or racial minorities might be especially vulnerable to the power of
authority because those groups generally feel they have less power in
society.1 50 While the data in this survey neither support nor refute that
argument as it applies to the poor or to racial minorities, 51 the data do
indicate that other groups generally expected to feel especially vulnerable-
the young and women-would in fact feel less free to leave in the face of
police authority.
150 See supra note 95.
151 There were no statistically significant differences between the racial categories or
between levels of income.
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D. EVEN PEOPLE WHO KNOW THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO LEAVE WOULD
NOT FEEL FREE TO LEAVE
Even people who know they have a right to leave a police encounter
reported that they would not feel free to do so. Although the group who did
not know of their right to leave' 52 had an average free-to-leave score of 2.32
for the sidewalk scenario and 2.25 for the bus, the group who did know
their rights still had averages of 3.04 and 2.93 (Table 4).153 So while the
people who knew their rights felt more free to leave, they still averaged
only halfway up the one-to-five scale. Their answers indicate that they felt
only "somewhat free to leave."'
5 4
Table 4
Average "Free to Leave" Scores by Knowledge
Did Not Know Rightst Knew Rights
Sidewalk 2.32 3.04
Bus 2.25 2.93
t 59.7% of the sample did not know their rights
- Difference between columns significant at the 0.1% level
152 There were 241 respondents who did not know their rights and 163 who did. People
coded as "knowing their rights" selected the fourth option for the third question in the
survey: "You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no consequence to
yourself." Those coded as not knowing their rights selected one of the other three options.
See supra Part 1II.B. That 60% of the sample did not know about their rights indicates "the
truth of the matter, namely that most people do not expect that they have the right not to
accede a police officer's request that a search be authorized." Burkoff, supra note 9, at 1138
(internal quotation marks omitted).
153 The differences between the two groups are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
154 See supra Part III; infra app. A.
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Figure 4: Effect on Freedom to Leave of Knowing Your Rights





o 60 - ___ __
S50- [ Don't know




0 -- - - I
1 2 3 4 5
Freedom to leave
Figure 5: Effect on Freedom to Leave of Knowing Your Rights
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The distribution of the results also supports this conclusion about
knowledge of rights (Figures 4 and 5). Almost 60% of the respondents who
did not know their rights reported they would feel either a 1 or a 2, while
only thirteen of those respondents, or 5%, reported they would feel a 5.155
Even though respondents who knew their rights were much more likely to
feel "completely free to leave," almost 40% of those knowledgeable
respondents still reported they would feel a I or a 2,156 and two-thirds
reported a 3 or less.
155 These percentages refer to the sidewalk scenario.
156 Thirty-seven percent in the sidewalk scenario and 42% in the bus scenario.
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E. SOME POSSIBLE CONCERNS
There are at least several possible criticisms of these findings, and I
will address three here. First, as discussed above, the sample may over-
represent groups who might feel less free to leave, such as people under age
twenty-five (Table 1). But even if one considers only the data for people
over twenty-five years of age, the conclusions remain the same. 57
Moreover, the sample population is quite representative of the overall U.S.
population in other respects (see Table 1, above).
A second concern is that people cannot accurately know how they
would feel in a situation they have not experienced; the forces that would
act on them in the heat of the moment are difficult to express while filling
out a piece of paper. 158 Even though this phenomenon is likely to exist in
the data, there is little reason to believe it would lead respondents to under-
express how free they would feel. The coercive pressures experienced
when actually dealing with a police officer are likely to make one feel less
free than when one is standing in a train station.
A third concern is that when people fill out a survey in a public space
with the surveyor hovering near by, those respondents may feel pressured
not to leave. They may then transfer that feeling of pressure into their
answers about how free they would feel in the hypothetical situations in the
survey, producing less reliable results. However, if that concern is correct,
it suggests that such situational forces do exist, and the coercive pressure on
an individual would not likely be greater when the authority figure is a
surveyor rather than a police officer. In addition, an earlier version of the
survey was administered to a group of law school students with no surveyor
present. The results from that pilot survey are consistent with the results
from the most appropriate comparison group in the larger sample,
respondents under the age of twenty-five, suggesting that approaching
people in public did not influence the results.
5 9
157 For instance, the average freedom-to-leave score in the sidewalk scenario is 2.61.
The average freedom-to-leave score for people over the age of twenty-four is 2.65,
suggesting that over-representing young respondents does not falsely suggest that people do
not feel free to leave.
158 See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 9, at 171 ("[R]esearch confirms the difficulty of
accurately imagining the extent to which situational constraints shape our behavior.").
159 In that sample of sixty-four Harvard Law School first-year students who had not yet
taken criminal procedure, the average freedom to leave scores were 2.34 for the sidewalk
and 2.13 for the bus. These results are slightly lower than the sample averages for people
under twenty-five, 2.41 and 2.26 respectively.
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V. DISCUSSION
The results of the survey suggest that the Supreme Court's use of its
seizure standard has been inconsistent with the reality of how people feel
when interacting with police officers. The Court's reasonable person
should resemble the average person described by the survey results; but the
reasonable person does not resemble the average person. Although the
average survey result, lying between "not free to leave" and "somewhat free
to leave," creates some ambiguity about how free people feel, the average
person certainly does not feel free to leave, an assumption repeatedly
articulated by the Court.160 It is unclear how the disconnect between the
Court's holdings and reality has come to be, but it is clear that the Court
should change its approach to seizure cases. The results of the survey
suggest that requiring a warning would not be an effective solution.
Additionally, the Supreme Court should consider two other possible
changes to its freedom-to-leave doctrine-applying empirical facts
accurately to its current standard, or adopting a new standard entirely.
The average person does not feel the way the Court believes a
reasonable person would, even though the reasonable person in law should
resemble the average person in reality.' 6' The reasonable person standard is
an objective standard. 162  That means the fact-finder must not take into
account subjective factors, such as the defendant's particular opinion of the
police, past experience with law enforcement, or even guilt,
163 in
determining whether a reasonable person in the same situation would have
felt free to leave. There has been some debate about which particular
160 See supra Part II.A. In none of the opinions using the Medenhall-Bostick standard
does that Court introduce any qualifier to "free to leave" that might suggest that a person
who feels "somewhat free to leave" is not seized.
161 See, e.g., Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters," supra note 11, at 250-51 (treating
the average person and reasonable person similarly); Steinbock, supra note 9, at 522-23
(explaining that the reasonable person standard "operates like a bell curve, with the
reasonable person defined as a certain number of standard deviations from the
mean .... [I]n a statistical sense, the reasonable person standard accurately captures the
beliefs and attitudes of the general population .... "). In fact, Justice Breyer's dissent in
Yarborough v. Alvarado went so far as to suggest that the reasonable person should be
defined with even more, not less, particularity than merely the "average person." 541 U.S.
652, 673 (2004).
162 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).
163 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 20, at 738 ("the subjective expectations of the particular
suspect [are not] determinative"); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in
Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Person," 36 How. L.J. 239,
241 (1993) ("[T]he reasonable person test assumes that a person's interaction with the police
is a generic experience .... "); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)
(making it clear that the reasonable person is presumed to be innocent).
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characteristics should be considered in defining the reasonable person.'
64
But at a minimum, the reasonable person is not purely abstract; the
reasonable person is a person with the general feelings and experience of
the community. 165 Nor does there seem to be a prescriptive component of
the reasonable person standard-the Court's discussions never suggest that
the reasonable person follows a stronger moral or ethical compass than does
the average person.166  Assuming the average results of this survey
accurately reflect the feeling and experience of the community,167 the
average results in the survey should, at least approximately, describe the
reasonable person referenced by the Court.
168
It is not clear why the Court has used the seizure standard in a way that
does not reflect reality. One possibility is that the Court is unaware of how
people actually feel when they interact with police officers.' Several
articles have noted that the Court seems out of touch with the reality of how
people feel about police encounters.170 At least one Justice has noted that
164 See, e.g., Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters, " supra note 11, at 250 (arguing that
the police and courts must consider the race of the person interacting with the police in
determining if a seizure occurred); Martha Minow & Todd Rakoff, Is the "Reasonable
Person" a Reasonable Standard in a Multicultural World, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND
TROUBLE CASES 40, 59-60 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that the reasonable person
should be defined relative to "group membership, social relations among groups, issues of
knowledge, and issues of dominance and subordination").
165 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 677, 720 (1998) (emphasizing the need for the Court to "direct[ly] access.. the
community's shared understandings"); Minow & Rakoff, supra note 164, at 42 ("The
imagined 'reasonable person' . . . acquires the morals, intelligence, and knowledge reflecting
community standards and perceptions, whether or not the particular individual actually held
them.").
166 See the discussion, for example, in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-
55 (1980). Of course, the reasonable person envisioned by the Court is an innocent person.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.
167 As discussed above, there is no reason to believe they do not. See supra Part IV.A.
168 See Steinbock, supra note 9, at 51 ("Since the Court has phrased its predominant test
in terms of the reasonable person, the constitutional question could clearly be merged with
the factual one: how would the average American perceive certain police practices?").
169 See, e.g., Burkoff, supra note 9, at 1129 ("[J]udges are arguably not doing a very
good job--after the fact and far removed from the scene-of appreciating the actual coercive
impact of a police officer's request for consent under these circumstances.").
170 See, e.g., Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters, " supra note 11, at 249-50 ("Common
sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpah or stupidity to tell a police officer to
'get lost'...."); Strauss, supra note 54, at 236 ("Numerous scholars and even judges have
made the very basic observation that most people would not feel free to deny a request by a
police officer."); cf Bacigal, supra note 165, at 720 ("[L]acking direct access to the
community's shared understandings, the Justices will not often find that a hypothesized
reasonable person's assessment of Fourth Amendment reasonableness differs from the
Justices' own assessment."); Simmons, supra note 57, at 800 ("The most frequent criticism
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empirical evidence should help determine seizure questions. 171 A second
possibility is that, while the Court is aware of how people feel when they
interact with police officers, 17 2 it has other reasons for inaccurately applying
facts to the standard. The Court may feel bound by a strong sense of stare
decisis to continue using the language of the standard,17 3 but equally bound
to declare that most people "feel free to leave" because it realizes that
accurately applying the facts might result in an enormous increase in the
number of seizures. Or the Court's use of the standard may be-although
not acknowledged as such-normative, or prescriptive, rather than positive,
of the consent search cases is that the Supreme Court is unaware of the realities on the
street .... ).
171 See supra note 60. Even beyond the discussion in Brendlin, the Court has sometimes
been persuaded by empirical evidence in other areas of criminal law. See, e.g., District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2860 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the
empirical evidence presented here [on gun control] is sufficient to allow a judge to reach a
firm legal conclusion"); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 649 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a legislature's determination about child abuse should be upheld
because it "is amply supported by empirical studies"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316
n.21 (2002) (accepting results from polling data as evidence of a consensus against executing
the mentally retarded); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 714 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court should reconsider
Miranda's rule "when presented with empirical data"). On the other hand, the Court has not
always been convinced by, or even willing to accept, empirical evidence. See, e.g., David L.
Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 588-94 (1991) (surveying a series of
cases where the Court has rejected empirical evidence that social scientists find persuasive);
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 57 n.4 (2008) (reporting the
Court's general resistance to empirical evidence in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006));
see also Dorf, supra note 59, at 38 ("The typical Supreme Court opinion cites dozens of
other Supreme Court cases, but scarcely any empirical data ...."). It is possible that the
Court remains willing to consider empirical evidence only when the studies are "particularly
unequivocal." Shawn Kolitch, Comment, Constitutional Fact Finding and the Appropriate
Use of Empirical Data in Constitutional Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 673, 696 n.100
(2006).
172 See., e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way
to the Numbers, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 106 ("Although judges daily proclaim piously
that a reasonable person in those circumstances should have known she had the right to keep
going, I doubt that any judge is completely convinced of that. Several of our D.C. Circuit
cases have referred to it as a convenient, albeit necessary, fiction.").
173 Cf Burkoff, supra note 9, at 1129 ("A second explanation for why judges routinely
find such searches to be consensual is, to my mind, even more persuasive-and much more
disturbing. Unfortunately, I believe that judges are holding that these searches are
consensual strictly as a matter of what might be called knee-jerk, 'result stare
decisis.' ... [J]udges are following the lead of the Supreme Court in the application of
prevailing consent doctrine, rather than following the consent-search doctrine itself and




or descriptive. 74  The Court may be holding citizens to a standard of
conduct it believes should be the norm in society, the conduct of the
idealized reasonable person. 17  Or the Court may have developed the
standard not so much as a tool for itself, but as a tool for law enforcement, a
guide about what actions are permissible. It is easier for law enforcement
officials to know if their actions would make the reasonable person feel
restrained than to know if their actions make the particular person with
whom they are currently dealing feel that way.
176
The Supreme Court should change its current seizure doctrine,
regardless of why that doctrine has taken its present form. The Court
currently maintains that it is asking one question, but it is either wrong in
how it answers that question or is in fact asking a completely different
question. Such a situation is primarily troubling because the Court seems to
be denying the protections of the Fourth Amendment to people who, under
the Court's own standard, are seized and so deserve those protections. This
situation is also troubling from the perspective of the lawyers, law
enforcement officers, and lower court judges who are trying to work with,
and be guided by, the Court's counterintuitive decisions.
The results of this study suggest that the Court should not consider
changing its current doctrine by adding a warning requirement. If people
who know their rights do not feel free to leave, the value of a warning is
questionable. The Court's holding in Robinette, that an officer does not
have to inform someone he has stopped that the person is free to leave,
appears to be acceptable at least to the extent that the warning would likely
have little effect on the person who is stopped. The Court's decision may
not have worsened the situation for citizens who are stopped or questioned.
Concern that requiring informed consent would reduce the number of
consent searches, however, is not supported by the data. These data suggest
that knowledge is not the panacea-other forces at work during even simple
174 See Steinbock, supra note 9, at 537 ("[T]he Court's conception of a reasonable person
has an implicit normative effect.").
175 The Court has never explicitly indicated that it includes such a prescriptive
component in its standard. Some commentators, however, have argued that the Court's
holdings in seizure cases can only be explained by a reasonable person who is "highly
artificial," Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining
When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988),
or even a reasonable "pachydermatous person"-a reasonable person with skin so thick that
he still would believe he had a choice to leave when faced with police questioning. LaFave,
supra note 20, at 739-40.
176 See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) ("The test's objective
standard-looking to the reasonable man's interpretation of the conduct in question-allows
the police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the
Fourth Amendment.").
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interactions with the police prevent individuals from feeling free to leave.
It is possible that the immediacy of the warning would itself increase the
likelihood that people would actually exercise the right about which they
had been informed, but much of the writing on this topic suggests that the
warning would have little effect.
177
But there are two changes the Court should consider based on the
results of this Article. First, the Court should consider applying the free-to-
leave standard more accurately to the facts in each case. The Court would
maintain the current reasonable person standard, but analyze the facts of
each case with a more critical eye, aware that most people feel coerced by
even small interactions with law enforcement. The Court could accomplish
this change gradually to avoid overturning its long line of precedents. Over
a series of cases, the Court could distinguish prior fact patterns, moving the
doctrine closer to an accurate description of reality.
The data in this Article suggest that applying an accurate reasonable
person standard would require the Court to consider carefully the level of
granularity at which it describes the reasonable person. Since women and
young people feel less free to leave than other groups, the Court should
consider, at minimum, adopting a "reasonable person of similar age" or
"reasonable person of the same gender" standard. While the Court has
occasionally given lip service to considering these characteristics in its
reasonable person analysis, 178 it is unlikely the Court currently gives them
proper weight. 179  Nonetheless, because some precedent for at least
considering those characteristics exists, the Court could give those
characteristics more weight without having to justify a major change in
doctrine.
This change to the Court's approach would lead to a large increase in
the number of people considered seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.180 That result would lead to a reduction in the number of
177 See supra text accompanying notes 106-08.
178 The Court has rarely addressed the question of how to consider the reasonable
person's gender or age (or race). DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 14, § 7.03(c)(3).
Several justices in Mendenhall did suggest that age and gender were "not irrelevant factors"
in the seizure analysis. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (plurality
opinion); cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) ("In determining whether
a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of
all the surrounding circumstances .... Some of the factors taken into account have included
the youth of the accused .... ).
179 For instance, in Mendenhall, the Court found that a reasonable person who was
twenty-two years old and female would not feel coerced when interacting with older, male
police officers. 446 U.S. at 558.
180 LaFave, supra note 20, at 741 ("[A] literal application of the 'not free to leave' test
would make virtually all police-citizen encounters of that type seizures .... ).
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encounters between police and citizens, since the police would have to
establish probable cause before almost every interaction, or risk the later
suppression of evidence. To the extent that one is concerned that the police
are taking advantage of the current doctrine to stop and search far too many
people, this result would be desirable. To the extent that one is concerned
about hamstringing police investigations, this result would be less desirable.
The second change that the Court should consider to its seizure
standard is to adopt a new standard entirely. A relatively easy option would
be for the Court to slowly tighten the wording of the seizure standard. Over
several cases, the Court could transition from asking whether a reasonable
person felt free to leave to some narrower test, such as asking whether a
reasonable person felt "restrained to such a degree that he had no possible
choice other than to comply with the officer's request."' 81  This solution
might be appealing from the Court's perspective, because it would require
neither a radical departure from precedent nor a sharp change in the way
law enforcement operates. It would be less appealing for people who
believe that the police currently have too much discretion to stop and search
citizens without probable cause. This change would still require the Court
to consider exactly how to describe the reasonable person.
A more radical option would be to shift the focus of the seizure
standard away from the reasonable person entirely and towards a different
perspective, such as that of a model citizen or of a police officer. If the
Court wants to make this change, it could perhaps justify the alteration on a
new understanding of what the "unreasonable" in the Fourth Amendment
means. There is nothing in the wording of the Amendment that requires
unreasonableness to be considered from the perspective of a reasonable
person. The Court could instead ask how a model citizen, one who has
some feeling of obligation to help the police and protect the community,
would feel when interacting with law enforcement. Alternatively, the Court
could ask whether a reasonable police officer, one who is aware of his duty
to protect a citizen's privacy interests as well as investigate crime, would
believe the seizure to be reasonable under the circumstances. 82 In either
case, it is not clear what the result of the new standard would be because the
result would depend on how the Court defined model citizen or reasonable
police officer. These more radical changes, and any other of the many
18 1 The description Professor LaFave has provided of how the Court actually determines
if a seizure occurs could also provide the wording for an alternative test. See supra note 20.
182 There is precedent for a standard that focuses on a "reasonable officer." See, e.g.,
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("[T]he 'reasonableness' of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene .... ).
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possible alternatives in a similar vein,' 83 would likely be less appealing to
the Court; they would require the reversal of several decades of precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the first set of empirical data addressing the
question of whether people would feel free to leave or otherwise terminate
encounters with police officers in two scenarios in which the Supreme
Court believes people would feel free. Those data were collected from 406
responses to a survey given in various locations in Boston. The results of
this analysis suggest that people walking on the sidewalk or riding on a bus
would not feel free to leave when approached by a police officer and asked
questions. Women and people under twenty-five felt relatively less free to
end the encounter. Even people who knew they had the right to leave or not
talk to the police officer still did not feel free to leave.
These results suggest that the Court has been applying its Fourth
Amendment seizure standard incorrectly. As a result, the Court is
determining that people who do not in fact feel free to leave are free to
leave, and it is therefore denying individuals the potential protections of the
Fourth Amendment. This Article has discussed two possible changes to the
Court's seizure doctrine-beginning to apply the standard more correctly,
and adopting a new standard entirely.
However, more empirical research is needed before any change
occurs.1 84 This Article presents the first study of its kind, and future studies
could build upon the initial work here. Future studies could more
accurately collect information on race and income, include more and more
complicated scenarios, and explore a broader set of locations throughout the
country. In addition, future surveys could employ more sophisticated
surveying techniques, such as randomizing the order of questions or
introducing multiple choice answers. It seems unlikely that the underlying
results will change, but additional empirical information will continue to
build the case that people interacting with the police do not feel as free to
leave police encounters as the Court has said they do.
183 See, e.g., Butterfoss, supra note 175, at 442 (1988) (proposing a per se rule based on
the subjective intent of the officer initiating the encounter).
184 See Lynch, supra note 94, at 234 ("I don't know that scholars can penetrate these
mysteries, either, but the broader perspective that comes from systematically surveying large
numbers of police officers and defendants may give a more realistic view of that process
than judges have.").
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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE
1. You are walking on the sidewalk. A police officer comes up to you and
says, "I have a few questions to ask you." Assume you do not want to talk
to the officer.
On a scale of I to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk away without
answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1 2 3 4 5
Not free Somewhat free Completely free
to leave or say no to leave or say no to leave or say no
2. You are riding the bus. A police officer comes up to you and says, "I
have a few questions to ask you." Assume you do not want to talk to the
officer.
On a scale of 1 to 5, please indicate how free you would feel to walk away without
answering or to decline to talk with the police officer.
1 2 3 4 5
Not free Somewhat free Completely free
to leave or say no to leave or say no to leave or say no
Which sentence best describes your legal rights in each of the above
situations?
1. You have the legal duty to talk with the officer even if you do not want to.
2. You have a legal duty to be reasonably helpful to the officer, but may leave in some
situations.
3. You have a legal right to ignore the officer, but he may assume you are guilty of
wrongdoing if you do.
4. You have the legal right to refuse to talk with the officer with no consequence to
yourself.
Please provide the following demographic information:
Age: Zip Code:
Have you ever been stopped before by a police officer?
[] [] []
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